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Abstract
An allocation’s ordinal efficiency deficit (OED) is defined as the greatest ordinal efficiency
loss that can result from its application. More precisely, an allocation’s OED is the negative
of the greatest total amount by which it may be stochastically dominated by another feasible
allocation. Thus, an allocation is ordinally efficient if and only if its OED is zero. Using this
insight, we set up a linear program whose optimal objective value corresponds to a given allo-
cation’s OED. Furthermore, we show that the OED is a piecewise-linear convex function on the
set of allocations. We use the optimal dual variables of the linear program to construct a profile
of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities that is compatible with the underlying ordinal
preferences, and which is a subgradient of the OED at the given allocation. When the given
allocation is ordinally efficient, our analysis implies that it is ex-ante welfare maximizing at the
constructed vNM profile, and we recover the ordinal efficiency theorem due to McLennan [10].
Keywords: random assignment, ordinal efficiency, linear programming, duality
JEL classifications: C61, D01, D60
∗The Earth Institute, Columbia University, sa2164@columbia.edu. I am grateful to Vikram Manjunath for many
insightful conversations and for his detailed comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. I thank Mihai Manea
and Jay Sethuraman for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1
1 Introduction
In an influential paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3] consider the probabilistic assignment of n
objects to n agents. Agents are endowed with strict ordinal preferences over the set of objects and
wish to be allocated the equivalent of one full object. To accommodate this fractional environment,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3] adapt the familiar notion of Pareto efficiency to random assignments
by introducing the concept of ordinal efficiency. A random assigment is ordinally efficient if agents
cannot trade probability shares of objects to achieve a new random allocation that stochastically
dominates the original one. Bogomolnaia and Moulin show that ordinal efficiency is equivalent to the
acyclicity of a particular kind of binary relation between objects.1 Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1]
provide a different characterization of ordinal efficiency based on a novel concept of dominated sets
of assignments. In recent years, ordinal efficiency has been seen as an important benchmark in ran-
dom assignment and has motivated the study and comparison of individual allocation mechanisms
(Manea [7], Manea [9], Kesten [6], Che and Kojima [4]).
McLennan [10] offers a different characterization of ordinal efficiency. In particular, he considers
the weak preference domain and shows that an allocation is ordinally efficient if and only if it is
ex-ante welfare maximizing at some profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities, which
are compatible with the underlying ordinal preferences. In his proof, he establishes and uses a new
version of the separating hyperplane theorem. Manea [8] provides a simpler, constructive proof of
McLennan’s result that is based on the acyclicity of the binary relation discussed in [3] and [5].
The constructed profile of vNM utilities is related to a given weak representation of this (acyclic)
binary relation.
Similarly to Manea [8], our work provides a simple constructive proof of McLennan’s charac-
terization. Given a feasible allocation and a profile of weak preferences, we define this allocation’s
ordinal efficiency deficit (with respect to the given preference profile) as the greatest total ordinal
efficiency loss that can result from its application. More precisely, an allocation’s OED is the neg-
ative of the greatest total amount by which it may be stochastically dominated by another feasible
allocation. For example, consider an economy with three agents (1, 2 and 3), and three objects (a,
b and c). Agent 1 strictly prefers object a to b and b to c; agent 2 strictly prefers b to c and c to
a; and agent 3 c to a and a to b (preferences are complete, reflexive, and transitive). Consider the
fractional allocation where all three agents are awarded a share of 1/3 of all houses. This allocation
is clearly ordinally inefficient, and is strictly dominated by many feasible allocations. Indeed, the
only ordinally efficient allocation in this economy is the deterministic outcome in which agent 1
gets all of a, 2 all of b, and 3 all of c. Focusing on agent 1 and his most preferred object a, we see
that the ordinal efficiency loss here is equal to -2/3; examining the same agent and the set of his
first and second-most preferred objects, a and b, the efficiency loss is -1/3. Adding the two together
1Katta and Sethuraman [5] extend Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s analysis to the weak preference domain.
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yields -1. Examining each agent in this way, we establish that the original allocation’s OED with
respect to the given preference profile is -3.2
Contribution. Clearly, an allocation is ordinally efficient if and only if its OED is zero. Using
this insight, we set up a linear program (LP) whose optimal objective value corresponds to a given
allocation’s OED. Furthermore, we show that the OED is a piecewise-linear convex function on the
set of allocations. We use the optimal dual variables of the previously mentioned LP to exhibit a
profile of vNM utilities that is compatible with the underlying ordinal preferences, and which is a
subgradient of the OED at the given allocation. This result is, in a sense, more general than the
ordinal efficiency theorem and points to a deeper connection between ordinal and cardinal measures
of efficiency in random-assignment problems. Indeed, when a given allocation is ordinally efficient
our analysis implies that it is ex-ante welfare maximizing at the constructed vNM profile, and we
recover McLennan’s result. It is our hope that the simplicity of our LP-based approach may prove
helpful in thinking about related problems in the growing field of random assignment.
Structure of the Paper. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model, and Section 3 provides a proof of McLennan’s [10] ordinal efficiency welfare theorem that
is based on LP duality. Section 4 generalizes the approach pursued in Section 3 to arbitrary (i.e.,
non ordinally efficient) allocations. It introduces the concept of an allocation’s OED and discusses
the interpretation of the constructed vNM utility profiles as subgradients of the OED at a given
allocation. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Model Description
Consider an economy with a set N of n agents and M of m objects indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n
and j = 1, 2, ...,m, respectively. Suppose without loss of generality that m ≥ n, allowing for the
possibility of “dummy” objects that correspond to not being assigned anything at all. Each agent i’s
preferences over the set of objects are expressed by the complete, reflexive, and transitive relation
i, and  denotes the economy-wide profile of preferences {i}ni=1. If objects j1 and j2 are such
that j1 i j2 and j2 i j1 then agent i is indifferent between them, and this is denoted by j1 ∼i j2.
If j1 i j2, but j2 6i j1, then agent i strictly prefers object j1 to j2, and this is denoted by j1 i j2.
In what follows, a prime symbol following a given (column) vector denotes the vector’s transpose.
An individual allocation for agent i is a non-negative column vector pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pim)′ such that∑
j pij = 1. An allocation p = (p
′
1, p
′
2, ..., p
′
n)
′ is a concatenation of a set of individual allocations pi
2For simplicity, from now on we omit making explicit the dependence of these concepts on the underlying preference
profile except where necessary.
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for i = 1, 2, ..., n that satisfies
∑
i pij ≤ 1 for all j ∈M .3 Let P denote the set of all allocations.
For agent i, an individual allocation pi dominates another qi at i, denoted pi i qi, whenever∑
aij
pia ≥
∑
aij
qia, for all j ∈M.
If at least one of the above inequalities is strict, then pi strictly dominates qi, which is denoted by
pi i qi. The dominance relation defined on an individual allocation extends to its economy-wide
equivalent in a natural way: an allocation p dominates an allocation q at  if pi i qi for every
agent i; p strictly dominates q at  if p dominates q, and if pi i qi for some agent i. Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [3] introduce the following efficiency criterion: An allocation p is said to be ordinally
efficient at  if there does not exist an allocation q that strictly dominates it at .
A profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions u =
(
ui : M → <, i ∈ N
)
is
compatible with a profile of ordinal preferences  if
ui(j1) ≥ ui(j2)⇔ j1 i j2, ∀j1, j2 ∈M, ∀i ∈ N.
Finally, an allocation p is ex-ante welfare maximizing at a profile of vNM utilities u if it maximizes
the social welfare function
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pijui(j),
over the set of feasible allocations.
3 A Duality Proof of the Ordinal Efficiency Welfare Theorem
For simplicity, assume that preferences are strict (Remark 1 clarifies how the argument extends to
the general case). In what follows, we use LP duality to provide a constructive proof of McLennan’s
ordinal efficiency welfare theorem.
Theorem 1 (McLennan [10]) An allocation is ordinally efficient at  if and only if it is ex-ante
welfare-maximizing at some profile of vNM utilities compatible with .
Proof. Consider an allocation pˆ ∈ P and denote by ji(k) agent i’s k’th most preferred object.
Where applicable, let 0 denote a zero vector of appropriate dimension. Consider the following
3Note how the elements pij of p are positioned in lexicographic order. For reasons that will become apparent in
Section 3, we avoid the more common representation of an allocation as a sub-stochastic matrix.
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linear program (LP) in standard form:
min
p,r,s
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
−rik
subject to:
∑
jiji(k)
pij − rik =
∑
jiji(k)
pˆij , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, ∀i ∈ N
m∑
j=1
pij = 1, ∀i ∈ N
n∑
i=1
pij + sj = 1, ∀j ∈M
p ≥ 0, r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0. (1)
By definition, the solution (p, r, s) = (pˆ,0, sˆ) (where sˆj = 1 −
∑n
i=1 pˆij for all j ∈ M), is feasible
and establishes an upper bound of 0 for the problem’s optimal cost (i.e., objective value).
Using the definition of ordinal efficiency, it is easy to see that pˆ is ordinally efficient if and only
if the optimal solution (p∗, r∗, s∗) of the primal problem (1) satisfies (p∗, r∗, s∗) = (pˆ,0, sˆ), thus
yielding an optimal cost of 0.
Taking the dual of (1), and letting 1 denote a unit vector of dimension n ·m, we obtain4
max
x,y,z
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
xik
∑
jiji(k)
pˆij +
n∑
i=1
yi +
m∑
j=1
zj
subject to:
m∑
j=k
xij + yi + zji(k) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, ∀i ∈ N
x ≥ 1
y free variable, z ≤ 0. (2)
By strong duality (see Theorem 4.4 in [2]), the primal problem has an optimal cost of 0 (which, as
mentioned before, is equivalent to pˆ being ordinally efficient) if and only if the optimal solution of
the dual problem (2), (xˆ, yˆ, zˆ), satisfies
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
xˆik
∑
jiji(k)
pˆij +
n∑
i=1
yˆi +
m∑
j=1
zˆj = 0. (3)
Now, let uˆ denote a profile of von-Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) utilities such that
uˆi(ji(k)) =
m∑
j=k
xˆij , k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, i ∈ N. (4)
Recall that since (xˆ, yˆ, zˆ) is feasible, we must have xˆik ≥ 1 for all i, k. In combination with Eq. (4),
this immediately establishes that uˆ is compatible with the ordinal preferences . Rearranging
terms, Eq. (3) can be rewritten in the following way
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
uˆi(ji(k))pˆiji(k) = −
( n∑
i=1
yˆi +
m∑
j=1
zˆj
)
⇒
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
uˆi(j)pˆij = −
( n∑
i=1
yˆi +
m∑
j=1
zˆj
)
(5)
4For details see Chapter 4.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2].
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Again by dual feasibility we must have
m− k + 1 ≤ uˆi(ji(k)) ≤ −
(
yˆi + zˆji(k)
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, i ∈ N
⇒ 1 ≤ ui(j) ≤ −
(
yˆi + zˆj
)
, ∀j ∈M, i ∈ N. (6)
Now, consider an arbitrary p ∈ P . We have
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
uˆi(j)pij
(6)
≤
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
−(yˆi + zˆj)pij (1) (2)≤ −( n∑
i=1
yˆi +
m∑
j=1
zˆj
)
(5)
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
uˆi(j)pˆij . (7)
Thus, pˆ is ex-ante welfare maximizing at the vNM utility profile uˆ, which is compatible with the
ordinal preferences .
We have proved that if pˆ is ordinally efficient, then it is ex-ante welfare maximizing for some
vNM utility profile that is compatible with the agents’ ordinal preferences. The other direction is
easily established (see Lemma 1 in [3]) so that the equivalence of the two statements follows.
It is easy to show that the optimal solution of the primal LP (1) always produces an ordinally
efficient solution, independently of whether pˆ is ordinally efficient.
Proposition 1 Consider the optimal solutions (p∗, r∗, s∗) and (xˆ, yˆ, zˆ) of the primal (1) and
dual (2) LPs, respectively. Moreover, consider the vNM utility profile uˆ, that is a function of the
optimal xˆ variables, given by Eq. (4). The following two statements hold:
(a) The allocation p∗ is ordinally efficient, and
(b) For all i ∈ N and j ∈M we have
p∗ij > 0⇔ uˆi(j) = −
(
yˆi + zˆj).
Proof. (a) As established in the proof of Theorem 1, if r∗ = 0 then p∗ = pˆ is ordinally efficient. So
we focus on the case r∗ 6= 0 and suppose that p∗ is not ordinally efficient. Then there exists a feasible
allocation p˜ which strictly dominates p∗. Consider the solution (p˜, r˜, s˜), where s˜j = 1 −
∑m
i=1 p˜ij
for all j ∈M , and
r˜ik = r∗ik +
∑
jiji(k)
(p˜ij − p∗ij) ≥ r∗ik, k ∈ {1, 2, ..,m}, ∀i ∈ N. (8)
The solution (p˜, r˜, s˜) is easily seen to be feasible for the primal problem (1) as
∑
jiji(k)
p˜ij − r˜ik =
∑
jiji(k)
p˜ij −
[
r∗ik +
∑
jiji(k)
(p˜ij − p∗ij)
]
=
∑
jiji(k)
p∗ij − r∗ik =
∑
jiji(k)
pˆij , ∀i, k,
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while all other constraints are trivially satisfied. Since p˜ strictly dominates p∗, at least one of the
inequalities given by Eq. (8) is strictly satisfied. This implies that the feasible solution (p˜, r˜, s˜)
yields a strictly smaller cost than (p∗, r∗, s∗) contradicting the latter’s optimality.
(b) This part follows trivially from the complementary slackness conditions (see Theorem 4.5 in [2])
p∗iji(k)
( m∑
j=k
xˆij + yˆi + zˆji(k)
)
= 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, i ∈ N.
Remark 1. It is straightforward to modify our argument when indifferences are allowed. Suppose
agent i is allowed to be indifferent between various objects, so that he has mi ∈ {1, ..,m} indifference
classes. Here, an object is said to belong in agent i’s k’th indifference class, Ii(k), if it is among his
k’th-most preferred. Consequently, we only introduce variables rik where k = 1, ...,mi, and adapt
the primal problem’s relevant constraints to5
∑
jiIi(k)
pij − rik =
∑
jiIi(k)
pˆij , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,mi}, ∀i ∈ N.
The corresponding dual constraints are modified to
mi∑
j=k
xij + yi + zj ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ Ii(k), k ∈ {1, 2, ...,mi}, ∀i ∈ N,
while the vNM utility profile uˆ is defined so that
uˆi(j) =
mi∑
j=k
xˆij , ∀j ∈ Ii(k), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,mi}, ∀i ∈ N.
The logic of the proof then carries over. Notice how the vNM utility profile uˆ assigns identical
utility to objects over which an agent is indifferent.
4 A Subtler Connection Between Ordinal Efficiency and vNM
Utilities
In this section, we make a more general connection between ordinal efficiency and the profile of vNM
utilities discussed in Section 3. Indeed, duality theory lends the constructed vNM utility profile uˆ
of Theorem 1 a novel economic interpretation, regardless of whether the candidate allocation pˆ is
ordinally efficient. Throughout, we fix a preference profile  and suppress the explicit dependence
5Abusing notation, we denote the set of objects that are at least as preferred to agent i as those in his k’th
indifference class by j i Ii(k).
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of our results on the economy’s preferences. Once again, we assume strict preferences; it is clear
how the results extend to the weak domain. We begin by defining the concept of a subgradient that
is pervasive in convex optimization.
Definition 1 Let f : X → < denote a convex function defined on a convex set X . Let xˆ ∈ X . A
vector v ∈ X is a subgradient of f at xˆ if
f(xˆ) + v · (x− xˆ) ≤ f(x), ∀x ∈ X .
Returning to our model, let p ∈ P and reorder its elements so that
pik = piji(k), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, i ∈ N.
Now, we define the vector-valued function g : P → <n·m, where g(p) = (g(p)′1,g(p)′2, ...,g(p)′n)′,
such that
g(p)ik =
∑
jiji(k)
pij , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..,m}, i ∈ N. (9)
Given column vectors xi ∈ <m for all i ∈ N , let x =
(
x′1,x′2, ...,x′n
)′ ∈ <n·m. Next, we define
u : <n·m → <n·m to be a vector-valued function, where u(x) = (u(x)′1,u(x)′2, ...,u(x)′n)′, such that
u(x)ik =
m∑
j=k
xij , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..,m}, i ∈ N. (10)
Echoing the proof of Theorem 1, we can rearrange terms and establish the following identity
x′g(p) = u(x)′p, ∀p ∈ P, x ∈ <n·m. (11)
We use the primal problem (1) to define an allocation’s ordinal efficiency deficit (OED) as the
negative of the greatest amount by which it can be stochastically dominated by another feasible
allocation. Or, equivalently, as the greatest ordinal efficiency loss that its application can result in.
Let F (pˆ) denote the feasible region of the primal problem (1) for a given pˆ ∈ P so that
F (pˆ) =
{
(p, r, s) ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣ ∑
jiji(k)
pij − rik =
∑
jiji(k)
pˆij ,
m∑
j=1
pij = 1,
n∑
i=1
pij + sj = 1, ∀i, j, k
}
.
(12)
The OED of an allocation pˆ is defined as the optimal cost of the primal problem (1) when the
allocation in the right-hand-side of the constraints constraints is given by pˆ. Formally, it is denoted
by a function D : P → <− such that
D(pˆ) = min
(p,r,s)∈F (pˆ)
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
−rik.
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Proposition 2 The ordinal efficiency deficit D(·) is a piecewise-linear convex function on the set
P .
Proof. The argument follows closely Section 5.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2]. Let pˆ ∈ P and
consider the associated dual LP (2). By strong duality, the dual’s optimal cost is finite and equal to
D(pˆ). To make the dual feasible region a polyhedron (see Definition 2.1 in [2]), we substitute the
free variable y by the difference of two non-negative variables y+ and y−. Since any real number
can be written as the difference of two non-negative real numbers, the two problems yield the same
optimal cost.
The set of (updated) dual constraints {x ≥ 1,y+ ≥ 0,y− ≥ 0, z ≤ 0}, ensures that the new dual
feasible region is a polyhedron that does not contain a line (see Definition 2.12 in [2]). Consequently,
Theorem 2.6 of [2] implies that the dual feasible region (unaltered by changes in pˆ) contains at
least one extreme point. Let
(
xk, (y+)k, (y−)k, zk
)
for k = 1, 2, ..., N be the extreme points of the
dual feasible region. By Theorem 2.8 of [2], the optimum of the dual must be attained at some
extreme point. Hence, we may write:
D(pˆ) = max
k=1,..,N
{(
xk, (y+)k − (y−)k, zk)′(g(pˆ),1,1)}
= max
k=1,..,N
{
u(xk)
′
pˆ +
(
(y+)k − (y−)k, zk)′(1,1)}. (13)
Since the maximum of a set of linear (and therefore convex) functions is itself convex, the result
follows.
We are now ready to generalize the insights obtained in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Consider a profile of preferences  and an allocation pˆ ∈ P . Let ji(k) denote agent
i’s k’th-most preferred object. Suppose the vector (xˆ, yˆ, zˆ) is an optimal solution of LP (2) and
consider the vNM utility profile uˆ where
uˆi(ji(k)) =
m∑
j=k
xˆij , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, i ∈ N.
This profile is (a) compatible with the underlying ordinal preferences, and (b) a subgradient of the
ordinal efficiency deficit D at pˆ.
Proof. Part (a) follows immediately from dual feasibility. We turn to part (b). The simple argument
follows the proof of Theorem 5.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2]. First, recall our earlier notation
u(xˆ)ik =
m∑
j=k
xˆij , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..,m}, i ∈ N.
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Strong duality implies that
(xˆ, yˆ, zˆ)′(g(pˆ),1,1) = D(pˆ)
(11)⇒ u(xˆ)′pˆ +
n∑
i=1
yˆi +
m∑
j=1
zˆj = D(pˆ).
Consider now an arbitrary p˜ ∈ P . By weak duality (see Theorem 4.3 in [2]), we have
u(xˆ)′p˜ +
n∑
i=1
yˆi +
m∑
j=1
zˆj ≤ D(p˜).
Hence, we may conclude that
u(xˆ)′(p˜− pˆ) ≤ D(p˜)−D(pˆ), ∀ p˜ ∈ P.
Remarks. Theorem 2 leads to some interesting observations. Suppose we have an allocation pˆ, its
associated optimal dual variables xˆ, and the resulting profile of vNM utilities uˆ = u(xˆ). Consider
an arbitrary allocation p˜. Theorem 2 implies that, at the vNM utility profile uˆ, the difference
in cardinal utility between p˜ and pˆ is bounded above by the difference of their ordinal efficiency
deficits. Thus, we arrive at a general relationship between these two measures of ordinal and cardinal
efficiency.
Moreover, when pˆ is ordinally efficient, we have that
u(xˆ)′(p˜− pˆ) ≤ D(p˜)−D(pˆ) = D(p˜) ≤ 0,
so that the allocation pˆ is immediately seen to maximize ex-ante welfare at uˆ, which, we recall,
is compatible to the underlying ordinal preferences. Thus, we arrive at a related, though slightly
different, proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem.
5 Directions for Future Research
The results in this paper provide a concise characterization of ordinal efficiency. In particular, an
allocation is ordinally efficient if and only if its ordinal efficiency deficit (OED), a piecewise-linear
convex function on the set of allocations, is zero. We believe that this insight, coupled with the
more general optimization framework explored in this work, may prove useful in future research in
random-assignment and house-allocation models. In particular, one may frame all sorts of existence
questions by setting up a trivial optimization problem (i.e., one with a zero objective), imposing as
constraints desired properties of efficiency, equity, and voluntary participation, and examining its
dual. A similar approach may be helpful in the comparison of individual allocation mechanisms;
10
in particular, one can attempt to provide bounds on the difference of their ex-ante welfare, for a
range of preference-compatible utility profiles.
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